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CASE NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TAX ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE
The petitioner, Norton Company, a Massachusetts corporation, manu-
factured abrasive machines and maintained general offices in Worcester,
Massachusetts. The company operated a branch office and warehouse in
Chicago which sold locally inventoried items directly to the purchaser.
For items not in local stock, sales to purchasers with no established credit,
and special order goods, the branch office forwarded the orders to Massa-
chusetts. Illinois purchasers sometimes completely bypassed the local
branch by ordering directly from the home office. Under the Illinois
Retailers' Occupation Tax,' which specifically exempts business in inter-
state commerce, the Department of Revenue collected a tax on the gross
income of the Norton Company's Illinois business which was upheld by
the Illinois Supreme Court.2 On appeal the United States Supreme Court
in a five to four decision reversed and remanded, holding that a state tax
on all sales involving the utilization of a branch office either in receiving
orders or distributing goods was valid and not a burden on interstate
commerce, but that a state could not validly tax proceeds from orders sent
directly to the corporation's home office in a sister state and shipped from
there to the customer. Norton Company v. Department of Revenue of the
State of Illinois, 340 U.S. 534 (1951).
The taxing power is inherent in sovereign states; however, the states
have apportioned their taxing power between the Federal Government
and themselves. The states have delegated to the United States the exclusive
power to tax the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce3 and it is
essential that no state be permitted to exercise this function.4 Courts are
called upon to reconcile competing constitutional demands that commerce
between the states shall not be unduly impeded by state action and that
the power to levy taxes for the support of state government shall not be
uinduly curtailed. 5 The Supreme Court has gone far in sustaining state
1 1I1. Rev. Stat. (1949) C. 12o, 5 441.
2 Norton Company v. Department of Revenue, 4o5 II1. 314, 90 N.E. zd 737 (1950).
-1 U.S. Const. Art. j, S 8, cl. 3.
4 Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (195i), restored to docket
for reargument, 340 U.S. 910 (1951).
5 McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (194o); Ford Motor
Co. v. Beauchamp, 308 U.S. 331 (1939); South Carolina Highway Department v.
Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938); Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Ry. Co. v.
Texas, zo U.S. 217 (9o8); Brown v. Houston, 114 U.S. 622 (t885); Woodruff v.
Parham. 8 Wall. (U.S.) 123 (1868); cf. Board of County Comm'rs of Jackson Coun-
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power to tax property and transactions,8 and the restrictive effect of the
commerce clause7 does not forestall all state action affecting interstate
commerce. 8
Forms of state taxation the tendency of which is to prohibit interstate
commerce, place it at a disadvantage with intrastate activity, or discrimi-
nate against it are examples of unconstitutional exercises of state taxing
power.9 Where, however, equality is the theme of the tax, there is no dis-
crimination against commerce between the states. 10 States may levy a tax
on a foreign corporation for the privilege of engaging in a local business,"
on the use of property,' 2 and on goods at the conclusion of their interstate
journey where the goods have come to rest.'3 States may not impose a
direct tax on interstate commerce or for the privilege of engaging in it.14
License taxes levied on the capital stock of a corporation engaged in inter-
state commerce have been rejected' 5 but have been sustained when fairly
ty, Kansas v. United States, 308 U.S. 343 (1939); Metcalf and Eddy v. Mitchell, z69 U.S.
514 (1926).
6 13 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 117-20 (1944), noting McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Company,
322 U.S. 327 (1944).
7 U.S. Const. Art. i, § 8, cl. 3.
8 McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (194o); South
Carolina Highway Department v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
9 McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940)-
10 Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 (1941).
11 Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 (1941); Ford Motor Co. v. Beau-
champ, 3o8 U.S. 331 (939); Atlantic Refining Co. v. Virginia, 302 U.S. 22 (1937);
Henneford v. Silas Mason Co, 300 U.S. 577 (1937); Wiloil Corp. v. Pennsylvania,
294 U.S. 169 (1935); Federal Compress and 'Warehouse v. McLean, 291 U.S. 17 (1934);
Bankers Brothers v. Pennsylvania, 222 U.S. 210 (1911); Telegraph Co. v. Texas,
1o5 U.S. 46o (88).
12 Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 3o6 U.S. 62 (1939); Southern Pacific Co. v.
Gallagher, 306 U.S. 167 (1939); Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937);
Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U.S. 86 (1934).
13 Minnesota v. Blasius, z9o U.S. 1 (1933); Bacon v. Illinois, 227 U.S. 504 (1913);
General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 2 11 (i98); American Express Co. v. Iowa, 196 U.S.
133 (1905); American Steel & Wire Co. v. Speed, 192 U.S. 500 (19o4); Emert v.
Missouri, i56 U.S. 296 (1895); Pittsburgh & Southern Coal Co. v. Bates, 156 U.S. 577
(1895); Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517 (I886); Brown v. Houston, 114 U.S. 622 (1885).
14 U.S. Const. Art. 1, S 8, cl. 3; Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S.
6o2 (1951); Dixie Ohio Exp. Co. v. State Revenue Commission of Georgia, 3o6 U.S. 72
(1939); Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher, 3o6 U.S. 167 (1939); Pacific Telephone &
Telegraph Co. v. Tax Commission of Washington, 297 U.S. 403 (1936); Baldwin v.
Seelig, 294 U.S. 511 (x935); Interstate Transit, Inc. v. Lindsey, 283 U.S. 183 (193');
New Jersey Bell Telephone Co. v. State Board, 28o U.S. 338 (1930); Leloup v. Port of
Mobile, 127 U.S. 640 (1888).
15 International Paper Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 135 (1918); Looney v. Crane,
245 U.S. 178 (1917); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. O'Connor, 223 U.S. 28o
(1912); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. i (1g).
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apportioned to that part of the capital attributable to intrastate activity."
A privilege tax on the gross receipts from interstate commerce 7 and a
tax on articles in the course of their interstate movement are both uncon-
stitutional.'8 Even a state tax on the privilege of engaging in a local busi-
ness is void if it imposes a direct burden on interstate commerce. 10
Although the state tax on the net income of an interstate corporation is
not a burden on intercourse between the states,20 a state tax on the gross
receipts of an interstate corporation is void. 21 A state tax on gross income
is valid, however, where the manufacturing is in fact intrastate.22
In the instant case, the Supreme Court was unanimous in holding that
the state could validly tax the income from the local over-the-counter sales
of the branch office. The majority opinion of the Court held that the
orders forwarded to Massachusetts by the local office were not interstate
commerce and, consequently, that the proceeds from such business activity
could properly be the subject of the Illinois tax. In his dissent, Mr. Justice
Reed, seeing no constitutional difference between salesmen in a branch
office and salesmen on the road, felt that the rule of McLeod v. J. E. Dil-
'worth Company"'2 should be applied. In that case, a tax on the transactions
of a corporation which were solicited by drummers in another state was
held to be a burden on interstate commerce. The doctrine has been gen-
erally well established that a state statute or municipal ordinance requiring
a license or imposing a tax for the solicitation of orders for goods located
outside of the state constitutes an unlawful interference with interstate
commerce.
24
10 Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp, 3o8 U.S. 331 (1939).
17 Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Ry. Co. v. Texas, 21o U.S. 217 (1908);
Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640 (1888); Fargo v. Michigan, 121 U.S. 230 (1887);
cf. Gwin, White & Prince v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 43 (1939).
18 Carson Petroleum Co. v. Vial, 279 U.S. 95 (i929); Hughes Bros. v. Minnesota,
272 U.S. 469 (9z6); Champlain Realty Co. v. Brattelboro, 260 U.S. 366 (192z); Case
of the State Freight Tax, if Wall. (U.S.) 232 (1872).
'9 Fisher's Blend Station v. State Tax Commission, 297 U.S. 65o (1936); Alpha Port-
land Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, z68 U.S. 203 (1925); Leloup v. Port of Mobile,
127 U.S. 640 (1888).
20 United States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321 (1918).
21 Gwin, White & Prince v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434 (1939). See J. D. Adams Mfg.
Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938).
22 Department of Treasury of Indiana v. Ingram-Richardson Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. z2
(1941); Fisher's Blend Station v. State Tax Commission, 297 US. 65o (1936). See J. D.
Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 US. 307 (1938); Philadelphia & Southern Steamship Co.
v. Pennsylvania, 1.2 U.S. 326 (887).
23 322 U.S. 327 (944).
24 Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U.S. 489 (887); Nippert v. City
of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946); McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944);
Stewart v. Michigan, 232 US. 665 (1914); Rogers v. Arkansas, 227 US. 401 (1913);
Crenshaw v. Arkansas, 227 U.S. 389 (1913); Caldwell v. North Carolina, 187 US. 6z
(goi); Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U.S. 289 0894); Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 US.
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In the case under discussion the Court distinguished for the first tiic
between solicitation by drummers and solicitation by a branch office. The
decision acknowledges the tax immunity where drummers are employed
but points out that the advantages gained by employing a local branch
office make transactions consummated by the use of such a branch office
local in nature. The Supreme Court decision was based on logic and com-
mon sense for it cited no supporting cases. By maintaining a branch office,
the Massachusetts corporation intended to keep close to the Illinois trade.
The trade might think the seller too remote to transact business if solicitors
were the sole means of contact between the vendor and the vendees. The
local office also affords service to machines after they are in the consumers'
hands and stands ready to offer engineering and technical advice. After
the foreign corporation has gained the confidence of its customers through
its local operations and has received the protection of the state, there is no
reason why it should not bear the burden of a local business.
Norton Company v. Department of Revenue of the State of Illinois
stands as a new development in the application of the Dilworth case inas-
much as it upholds a tax on solicitation through a branch office. The case
also exemplifies three views as to what constitutes interstate commerce.
The majority opinion holds the middle ground. The conservative view is
expressed in Reed's dissent that only proceeds from direct sales should be
taxed and the liberal view in Justice Clark's dissent which extended the
reasoning of the majority of the Court to apply to all types of transactions
carried on by the Norton Company. It would seem that despite mechani-
cal or artificial distinctions sometimes made to arrive at decisions as to the
validity or invalidity of particular taxes, the decisions are predicated on
practical judgment as to the likelihood of the tax being used to place inter-
state commerce at a competitive disadvantage.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-DENIAL OF EQUITABLE ENFORCE-
MENT OF FOREIGN ALIMONY DECREE
Plaintiff recovered a New York decree for divorce and alimony pay-
able in installments, and sought to enforce it in Illinois. While the plaintiff
was allowed to set up the past due installments as a foreign judgment and
recover same as a debt, it was held that equitable relief, by way of civil
contempt for failure to pay future alimony installments, was properly
denied. Tailby v. Tailby, 342 I11. App. 664, 97 N.E. 2d 6i ( 3d Dist., 1951)
The Tailby decision is the third case to be decided in Illinois as to
whether equity will enforce a foreign alimony decree. The first was Rule
141 (1889); Asher v. Texas, 128 U.S. 129 (1888); Carson v. Maryland, 1zo U.S. 5o2
(1887). Contra: Re Rudolph, z Fed. 65 (C.C. Nev., 188o); Dunston v. City of Norfolk.
177 Va. 689, 15 S.E. zd 86 (1941); Collier v. Burgin, 13o N.C. 632, 41 S.E. 874 (1902).
